

DD605/A16

U.S.S. CALDWELL (DD605)

jb

Serial 003

15 December 1944

S-S-C-R-E-T

From: Commanding Officer.
To : Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Via : (1) Commander Destroyer Squadron FOURTEEN.
(2) Commander Task Group 78.3.
(3) Commander Task Force 78.
(4) Commander SEVENTH Fleet.
Subject: Report of Action with the Enemy, Ormoc Bay, Philippine Islands, December 11 - 12, 1944.
Reference: (a) ComSEVENTHFLT Conf. ltr, Serial 0212 of 17 February 1944.
(b) ComDesRonFOURTEEN Operation Order, Serial 0001 of 10 December 1944.
Enclosure: (A) Copy of Reference (b).
(B) Rough Track Chart.
(C) Casualty List.

PART I - GENERAL NARRATIVE.

The amphibious landings at Ormoc Bay the previous week having been successful, resupply echelons were necessary. An echelon composed of thirteen LSM's and LCI's screened by the USS CALDWELL (DD605), USS COGHLAN and USS EDWARDS of Destroyer Division TWENTY-EIGHT, and the USS SMITH (DD110), USS CONYNGHAM and USS REED of Destroyer Squadron FIVE left Leyte Gulf bound for Ormoc. The basic plan was to make as much of the three hundred mile trip as possible in darkness and under the protection of our own aircraft. Landing craft were to arrive at the Ormoc beachhead at about 2300, December 11th, and leave as soon as unloaded. Due to the loss of the USS COOPER, USS MAHAN and USS WARD in these waters, and the damaging of many other destroyers, the Reserve-on-Board registered publications and pay accounts were left in the San Pedro Bay area, Leyte. Only the USS CALDWELL carried her COM. Air support from the Leyte strip at Tacloban was promised.

Japanese forces held part of Ormoc Bay and had strong airfields on Cebu and Mindanao. No surface enemy forces equal in strength were expected, and actually none but barges were encountered.

All times herein are zone description Minus Nine (Item).

PART II - CHRONOLOGICAL RECORD OF EVENTS.

December 11, 1944

- 1040 - Formation completely formed, departed southern Leyte Gulf for Ormoc via Surigao Strait.
- 1517 - Jap snoopers crossed ahead of the formation 13 miles away.
- 1612 - With the south point of Limasawa Island bearing 008°T, distance 6,700 yards, changed course to 307°T. Formation D-2 in use, speed 12 knots.
- 1700 - Went to general quarters upon enemy planes being sighted bearing about 320°T, range 21,000 yards. There were nine planes formed in three sections, the leading section in a "V", the trailing two sections in inverted "V"'s; altitude about 2,500 feet. These planes were close to land, along the mountains above Maasin, Lat. 10°08'N, Long. 124°50'E. The trailing sections made a circle, probably to give the leading section time to get in position. The leading section, believed a pre-designated unit for suicide attack if the opportunity arose, started around the starboard side of the formation and in on the USS REED (inboard leading ship) which commenced firing. About this time the others were intercepted by the Corsair CAP. Some seemed to come on in, some were shot down by the CAP. The USS REED hit the leading plane, but it crashed into her main deck amidships; followed almost immediately by the second plane which also hit her.

Serial 003

15 December 1944

S-E-C-R-E-T

Subject: Report of action with the enemy, Ormoc Bay, Philippine Islands,
December 11 - 12, 1944.

She apparently blew up aft, then rolled over on her side, hung for perhaps thirty seconds with her mast along the surface and then sank.

Meanwhile the USS CALDWELL fired on the main group of Jap planes. One was hit and crashed, it is believed from our fire. Another plane came on over us and was taken under fire by the main battery. At this time the port machine guns opened up on a plane passing down the port side. A F4U apparently saw our danger from this last plane and disregarding the danger from our fire crossed us at mast-head height to get the Jap. One 20MM gun shot 15 rounds at him before he was recognized; but did not hit him. The Zeke came on in a steep bank to his port, crossed the fantail and crashed twenty feet to starboard, drenching the bridge with gasoline and debris. Either the left full rudder at 32 knots, the Corsair, or our port 40MM and 20MM hits on him caused him to miss, but everyone was pretty much shaken up. At this point control observed the plane at which the main battery had been shooting crash about 1,000 yards to starboard.

By order of Comdesron FOURTEEN the USS COGHLAN was standing by the USS REID, and about five LCI's had stopped and were recovering survivors. The USS CONYINGHAM had taken the USS REID's station.

- 1709 - Ceased firing. Enemy retired. Proceeded on mission. Position: Lat. 09°57'N, Long. 124°56'E.
- 1822 - Sunset, darkened ship.
- 1853 - The convoy, completely reformed except for the USS REID, resumed a speed of 12 knots.
- 2000 - Secured from general quarters.
- 2028 - USS COGHLAN reported a total of 152 men and 14 officers, including the Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, recovered from the USS REID.
- 2207 - Commenced observing flares and gunfire, which together with aircraft "heckling" was to last all night.
- 2216 - Called all hands to general quarters.
- 2320 - Made surface radar contact on two small targets off Biasong Point evaluated as enemy barges. Radar interference as from a radar of about 900 cycles was received from this area.
- 2332 - The landing craft were vectored toward their beaches and released.

December 12, 1944

- 0016 - USS SMITH reported being strafed.
 - 0020 - The Communication Officer observed two red aircraft flares nearby, the current recognition signal.
 - 0021 - A large green aircraft flare was dropped to the southeastward, about 1,500-2,000 yards away, and what looked like blinking light signals were observed from a plane to the beach near the enemy barges bearing northwest.
 - 0022 - A large (36" or larger) searchlight placed about on Biasong Point opened up directly on the ship, indicating either radar control or the effectiveness of the flare dropped on the other side of us. Heavy machine gun fire and light artillery (estimated 3") opened up on us and was returned. Many straddles but no hits were received. This fire was from the enemy ships or the beach beyond them.
 - 0026 - A strafing run was made across the stern by what sounded like a Jake, although it wasn't seen. The fantail was holed but damage was insignificant.
 - 0027 - The main battery put the enemy searchlight out of action. It flared up briefly and then burned out.
- NOTE: Several times during the night the enemy barges were strafed by a plane or planes using white tracer.
Retired to the southward to about Lat. 10°50'N.

Serial 003

15 December 1944

S-E-C-R-E-T

Subject: Report of Action with the Enemy, Ormoc Bay, Philippine Islands,
December 11 - 12, 1944.

- 0153 - USS COGHLAN took enemy craft under fire as they slowly worked down the west side of Ormoc Bay, ceasing when they finally disappeared toward Apali Point.
- 0400 - Returned to northern part of Ormoc Bay to rendezvous with convoy.
- 0420 - Contacted LCI's and LSM's coming out from the beach. Made surface contact on a large, fast unidentified target standing out from near Ormoc Town heading for Apali Point. USS COGHLAN drove the craft back to the beach with gunfire. Convoy commenced retiring southward, under continual threat of air attack. From this time on, indeed from early the previous evening, there were enemy aircraft contacts almost continually.
- 0612 - Sighted three enemy planes passing overhead, elevation 3,000 feet, weather cloudy.
- 0624 - Sighted three enemy planes overhead.
- 0650 - Sighted planes overhead.
- 0800 - Position: Lat. 10°30'N, Long. 124°42'E. Himuquitan Island close aboard to starboard, Amogotada Point close aboard to port. Maneuvering as radically as proximity of land permits.
- 0801 - Enemy planes sighted to west and southwest closing rapidly. Estimated number twenty-five, including Dinahs and Zekes. Changed speed to 32 knots. The CAP intercepted and a Jap plane was seen to crash. A parachuting person was also seen.
- 0805 - Commenced firing at a flight of Dinah's on the starboard bow. Noticed three Zekes detach and head for us. Control slewed on to this new threat. Two Zekes peeled off for dive-bombing and were kept under fire by the main battery. The third Zeke came down the port side, under continual machine gun fire, crossed the stern in a steep bank. One landing gear was flopping out. He went into a vertical bank and at 0807 hit the ship just as he was turning over on his back. One wing hit the bridge, one the break of the forecastle, and the fuselage in Main Radio. Simultaneously, the ship was straddled with several bombs (according to observers on three other ships), one striking and exploding No. 2 Handling Room. A bomb from the suicide plane glanced off No. 2 Gun and exploded just to the starboard of No. 1 Gun. This was a perfectly planned and excellently coordinated attack. Due to the fire getting close enough to scorch his men, CTM Carr (CARR, George Peter, 120 57 98, CTM, V-6, USNR) very properly jettisoned all five MK-15 MOD-1 torpedoes (all communication to Torpedo Control and the Bridge was lost). The Captain was among those wounded but refused to leave the Bridge.
- 0808 - The starboard 40MM ceased firing. Unable to bear on planes attacking this ship, the mount was firing at a plane attacking an adjacent destroyer. The plane crashed into the sea, probably due to combined fire.
- 0843 - LCI-744 came alongside to port to assist.
- 0848 - LCI-543 came alongside to starboard to assist.
- 0908 - Most wounded were transferred to the LCI's, the fires were under control, and the LCI's got underway from alongside. Engineering spaces reported full power was still available.
- 0910 - Because of a severely painful hand injury, and by order of Comdesron FOURTEEN, Commander George Wendelburg, U.S.Navy, 72318, was placed on the sick list and the Executive Officer, Lieutenant Commander Dunlap R. Robinson, D-V(G), U.S.N.R., 82869, succeeded to command. Proceeded.
- 1005 - Transferred Comdesron FOURTEEN and Staff to LCI-661 for further transfer to USS COGHLAN where he resumed tactical command. Proceeded to San Pedro Bay, Leyte Gulf, without further attack.

Serial 003

15 December 1944

S-E-C-R-E-T

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December 11 - 12, 1944.

PART III - PERFORMANCE OF ORDNANCE MATERIEL.

- A. Ammunition Expenditure; -
- | | |
|----------------|--------------------------|
| 5"/38 cal. AAC | - 200 rounds (50% MK-32) |
| 40MM | - 1,425 rounds |
| 20MM | - 780 rounds |
- B. The tragic explosion of No. 2 Handling Room was aggravated by the fact that the ship's bombardment allowance of 50 rounds WP projectiles, which was stowed there, caused a terrific fire.
- C. FD Radar - For several weeks there had been intermittent failures of the FD Radar and all talent available had worked on it so that it was believed to be in satisfactory condition. It failed miserably, however - - control could not even pick up the enemy surface craft.
- D. All other ordnance equipment operated very well.

PART IV - BATTLE DAMAGE.

- A. Own:
- Demolished: Main battery guns No. 1 and No. 2; all forecastle deck compartments forward of Frame 60; all main deck compartments, Frame 35 to 47; 20MM gun No. 2; five MK-15 MOD-3 torpedoes jettisoned.
 - Heavily damaged by fire and fragments: Director; Torpedo Director; Director Platform; Bridge; C.I.C.; Wardroom; First Platform Deck compartments, Frame 20 to 55; fire control switchboard; 20MM sponsons Nos. 1, 3 and 5.
- B. Enemy losses as seen from the USS CALDWELL:
- December 11th.

CAP	- Several, undetermined.
REID	- 2 suicide crashes.
CALDWELL	- 1 probable in the main group, 1 close aboard, 1 suicide crash.
 - December 12th.

CAP	- 1 sure.
CALDWELL	- 1 suicide crash, 1 by 40MM to starboard.
 - Summary:
The USS CALDWELL makes no claims. Due to the confused scene and loss of key personnel, it is almost impossible to say who shot what down. The best available evidence, which is not very good, would indicate the ship (singly or assisted) shot down five planes if the suicides, both of which were hit, are included. The main point to us is that the echelon got to Ormoc.

PART V - SPECIAL COMMENTS.

- A. C.I.C.
Radar navigation was successful in taking the formation through Canagao Channel without trouble. Three shoal buoys, two to port and one to starboard, were picked up by SG Radar at about 3,500 yards. This vessel navigates in such restricted waters by taking SG ranges only to points prominent on the PPI and crossing the resultant arcs. It is believed that the overlay method is not necessary and is too cumbersome in this terrain where good sized hills come down abruptly to the sea and where favorable angles for crossing arcs are almost always available.

Serial 003

15 December 1944

S-E-C-R-E-T

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A. C.I.C. (Continued)

C.I.C. located fishing craft with which the area abounds, and had little difficulty in picking up enemy barge traffic. One disadvantage, at least in this type of C.I.C., is lack of room to navigate and yet do effective surface plotting. The chart was mounted on the DRT which was set to scale, but it is quite often a scale almost useless for good surface tracking. More operational charts on a scale of 1,000 yards per inch are recommended.

Because of the land echoes in the Philippines, the SG Radars are frequently useless - especially for Fighter Direction. It is believed that the present doctrine of securing them entirely is very sound. Radar interference was observed on SG coming either from the barges or Biasong or Nabonic Points, Ormoc Bay, at a repetition rate of about 900 cycles.

B. Suicide Crashes.

There is no doubt that the high rate of success of this tactic is causing grave anxiety to all of us. The Japs apparently send out Dinah's on bombing missions with a Zeke escort. A section of fighters is prepared to make a coordinated suicide-dive bombing attack if the right opportunity presents itself. While Dinah's get the attention a section of Zeke's makes a run on a ship with one or all designated to crash. The planes always choose our inboard (closest to land) screening ship and don't bother the convoy itself. In making the attack they come down the port side within range of the machine guns, bank steeply to the left, cross the stern, go into a vertical bank and start to roll over on their backs, usually striking the ship on the starboard side forward. If they turn too soon or the ship has right rudder on they hit about No. 1 stack. If they turn late or the ship has left rudder on they crash close aboard to starboard

If the USS CALDWELL knew of any satisfactory defense she wouldn't have been hit, but the following points are pertinent:

1. Long range interception defeats the attack but is very difficult in Central Philippine confined waters, even if sufficient fighters were available.
2. It is not believed that using the 36" searchlight in automatic in daytime would help, but it is a trick that has everything to gain and nothing to lose and, so, is worth trying.
3. The use of WP projectiles might work and it is recommended that it be tried. This ship feels the value of WP is outweighed by its menace.
4. In the future, the installation of some type of mortars on the quarters, to throw out a smoke grenade at the normal plane approach position, might be an answer. It has been suggested by the Commanding Officer of the USS CABLE, which has repaired many damaged ships.
5. It is believed that the best way to meet a suicide attack is to steam steadily until the pilot commits himself and then maneuver radically, favoring a sharp turn to port. This should also improve gunnery. It is also believed that we are neglecting to make full use of smoke. Where the standard pattern is to attack from the quarters, smoke becomes especially valuable.
6. In the Ormoc area, where the enemy has had the most success, it is suggested that although conditions may well warrant the risk of destroyer losses to protect vitally needed men and materials enroute, that the delivery of the materiel throws the balance the other way and the destroyers could immediately commence retiring at high speed and be almost out of danger by daylight.

Serial 003

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S-E-C-R-E-T

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C. Damage Control.

1. Attendance of every line officer and over half the crew at Pearl Harbor Fire Fighting School gave the needed confidence and experience to put out a phosphorus fire which at first could only be attacked from the lee side.
2. The ship's policy of keeping hoses connected hand tight is sound. It took very little time to tighten up connections and those which needed shifting were easily broken.
3. The ship's policy of having two lengths of hose connected to each fire plus is not sound. Such great length was not needed and the hoses kinked badly in the confined spaces. To have one length connected and two stored nearby is recommended.
4. White phosphorus shells stowed in the No. 2 Handling Room exploded, sending out violent fumes and intense heat. Although fog nozzles finally cooled the chemical down below the ignition point, phosphorus was scattered all over the forward compartments by the water, and when it dried would re-ignite. This condition lasted for about 36 hours, by which time most phosphorus had been located and shovelled out.
5. Of valuable assistance in determining casualties were the mimeographed lists of name, rank/rate, file/service number of all persons aboard; distributed to about 20 persons prior to departure.
6. The carbon dioxide system in the inflammable liquids storeroom worked perfectly. The fire resistant paint was very effective.

PART VI - PERSONNEL.

- A. Enclosure (C) indicates in detail the casualties. Totals were: Killed in Action - 20; Died of Wounds or Injuries Received in Action - 4; Missing in Action - 9; Wounded in Action - 40. Of the latter, all were transferred for further treatment and 16 returned to this vessel.
- B. Recommendations for awards will be the subject of separate correspondence. As has consistently been true throughout the service, the personal sacrifices made and the extreme bravery shown in the face of death is beyond belief or expression. Several men manned and fired machine guns until actually struck down by the plane. Others dashed into the blazing hell that was once No. 2 Handling Room and in the face of burning phosphorus extricated the dead and wounded. Several persons were throwing overboard unexploded WP shells all during the fire in spite of the fact that they were badly burned by phosphorus. These comments apply equally to the Staff of Comdesron FOURTEEN. The thing that was most gratifying was the coolness with which all hands met the emergency. There was no shouting, no flinching, things were accomplished smoothly and rapidly. I know I shall never meet a braver, more capable, gang of men.

D. R. Robinson
D. R. ROBINSON.

Copy to:
Comlnch (advance),
Cincpac,
Comdespac.

C-O-P-Y

COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON FOURTEEN
% Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California




Al6-3
Serial: 0001

~~T-O-P-S-E-C-R-E-T~~

10 December 1944

From: Commander Destroyer Squadron FOURTEEN.
To : Escorts for Re-Supply Echelon Ormac.
Subject: Letter of Instructions.
Reference: (a) Movement Order.
(b) ComPhib Group Nine Atback Order 5-44.

1. Screens - Dog 1, Dog 2, and Dog 3.



C-O-P-Y

ENCLOSURE (A)

AL6-3
Serial: 0001

C-O-P-Y
COMMANDER DESTROYER SQUADRON FOURTEEN
% Fleet Post Office
San Francisco, California.

~~T-O-P~~ S-E-C-R-E-T

10 December 1944.

Subject: Letter of Instructions.

2. Screen and patrol at objective. Stations one through four are four thousand yards in length, 5 and 6 six thousand yards, reference point midway between Baod and Bagonbon Rivers.

Station 1.	Reid	Midpoint	246	range 5000	cs.	209
2.	Caldwell		212	8300		173
3.	Coghlan		196	10,500		306
4.	Edwards		172	10,750		254
5.	Conyngham		223	11,000		180
6.	Smith		200	12,600		270

On sortie for return, take patrol stations as in Dog 3. Axis will be approximately 150 True.

3. Four boilers to be on the line at all times.

4. When and if under air attack, maneuver individually and radically for self protection, but do not permit such maneuvers to leave convoy unprotected.

5. During darkness ships will not, repeat not, open fire without specific authority from me except in a known emergency where planes are actually attacking at very close range.

6. During darkness, do not use SC radar.

7. Friendly anti-aircraft fire may be expected from the beaches all the way up the Leyte West Coast. This is considered to be a help to this group.

8. Considerable barge and small craft Army and Navy traffic may be encountered on the West Coast of Leyte. Any craft approaching the disposition at speeds in excess of 15 knots are to be viewed with suspicion.

9. Ships gunfire against shore targets will be counter-battery only.

10. All ships must be prepared to tow and be towed and rescue survivors as necessary.

11. Guard circuits as outlined in reference (a) and also keep a close watch on Mike Nan.

12. Communications.
Fleet Common 3905(P)
Fleet Common 4010(S)
Fleet Common 34.8
LAW (if ordered) 3115 kcs.
General Air Warning (if ordered) 3000 kcs.


13. Special Radio Guards
Smith - Army CAP Emergency Circuit 3080; also
Fighter Director Circuits.
Reid - Peetee Frequency - 3274
Caldwell - CW 2415
Voice 3000

/s/ W. S. ROUNTREE,
Lieut(jg), USNR
Operations Officer

J. F. NEWMAN, Jr.

C-O-P-Y

ENCLOSURE (A)



W ← 124°30'E

11°00'N

10°30'N

10°00'N

TYPICAL ATTACK



PLANE

LEYTE

ISLAND

LEYTE GULF

CALDWELL HIT 0807/12th

REID SUNK 1700/11th

LIMASAWAN 1695

N ↑

124°30'E

I₀

I₀

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U.S.S. CALDWELL (DD605)

CASUALTY REPORT - DECEMBER 12, 1944

KILLED IN ACTION

APPENZELLER, Herbert Paul	RM1c(T), V-3	610 78 88	(Flag-CDRL4)
CLOUGH, Arthur Russell	SK3c, V6S	869 76 29	
COURTNEY, Harold Jack	F2c, V6S	866 88 83	
DE VOTO, William Jean, Jr.	F2c, V6S	880 22 95	
FROIO, Frank	GM3c, V-6	600 59 47	
GALLEGOS, Juan Sacramento	F2c, USN-I	889 72 55	
KROCHT, Reginald William	Cox(T), V6S	821 11 06	
PARKS, Donald Keith	RM3c(T), V-6	619 29 79	(Flag-CDRL4)
PATINO, Santiago	Cox(T), V-6	576 94 07	
PEAKE, Vernon Leroy	S1c	393 77 51	
PENNOYER, Marvin Lynn	CRM(T)	381 26 64	
PEOPLES, Joseph	S1c(RM), V6S	942 08 09	(Flag-CBR14)
ROGERS, Claude Worley	S2c, V6S	835 68 54	
SALVITTI, Alfred	S1c, V6S	818 50 73	
SLAUGHTER, Barney Lee	RM3c, V-3	618 42 08	
STRONG, Louis Calvin	GM3c, V-6	702 65 38	
VALDEZ, Joel (n)	F1c, V-6	625 10 49	
WELCH, Lawrence Junior	S2c, V-6	756 15 65	
ZIELINSKI, Frank Adam	F1c, V-6	611 49 50	
ZIMMER, John Richard	S2c, V-6	613 54 48	

Total - 20

DIED OF WOUNDS OR INJURIES RECEIVED IN ACTION

DEASON, James Sheppard	S2c, V6S	943 36 30
DITTOE, Patrick Emmet	GM2c	360 54 32
WALL, Donald Hue	S2c, V6S	945 23 97
ZANETTI, Alfred Charles	S2c, V6S	896 08 84

Total - 4

MISSING IN ACTION

CLARKE, Floyd Robert	RT1c, V-6	648 10 49
DAVIS, Horace Mastin	S2c, V6S	938 54 96
GARRETT, John Patrick	S1c	381 90 27
KRAVEC, Michael John	S1c, V6S	807 51 03
KUZMIAK, Charles	Y3c(T), V6S	821 80 00
PIREZ, Jesus Marquez	SC3c, V-6	555 82 59
SWANSON, Paul Alvie	EM2c	372 44 52
THOMPSON, Joseph Clarence	SK1c	311 15 84
WILBER, Kenneth Grant	S2c, V6S	962 60 00

Total - 9

WOUNDED IN ACTION

The below listed personnel were transferred to a hospital ship for further treatment (December 12, 1944):

WENDELBURG, George	Commander, USN	72318	
DUDEK, John Melvin	Lieut., MC-V(G)	154781	
FLADAGER, Vernon LeRoy	Lieut.(jg), SC-V(G)	247147	
ALLEN, Stephen Gatchell Jr.	Ensign, D-V(G)	341333	
DEVITT, Edward James	Lieut., I-V(S)	211299	(Flag-CDD28 for temp. duty)
ELLIOTT, Ellis Eugene	RT2c, V-2	654 25 69	
KOPCZYNSKI, Chester	SC2c, V6S	805 35 87	
MC GLEAM, William Joseph	GM2c, V-6	662 49 25	
MC NEAL, Roy Herman	S1c, V-6	604 79 12	
MULVIHILL, Joseph Jr.	TM3c	382 88 31	
OLSEN, Norman John Jr.	PhM3c, V-6	647 70 28	
ROBBINS, Robert Foster	S1c, V6S	803 01 10	
SALTZ, John Thomas	S2c, V-6	726 65 86	

ENCLOSURE (C)

U.S.S. CALDWELL (DD605)

CASUALTY REPORT - DECEMBER 12, 1944 (Continued)

WOUNDED IN ACTION (Cont'd)

The below listed personnel were transferred to a hospital ship for further treatment (December 12, 1944): (Continued)

STIER, Marvin Walter	RM3c(T), V-6	648 90 10	
WARD, Shannon Ross	S2c, V6S	941 34 46	
WATKINS, David Walter	S2c, V6S	924 98 30	
WEBER, Chris (n)	RdM3c(T), V-6	663 36 09	
WERNER, Fredrich Albert	S2c, V6S	945 23 26	
WETZEL, Loren Adolph	S2c, V6S	955 86 79	
WHITE, Frank "D"	S2c, V6S	964 52 98	
WILDLAN, Everly Ray	S2c, V-6	756 73 71	
WRIGHT, Paul Adli	Slc, V6S	895 28 40	
VASILOVICH, Stanley (n)	RM3c, V-6	663 27 15	(Flag-CDR14)
VOYLES, Willie Gene	RM2c, V-6	670 45 90	(Flag-CDR14)

Total - 24

The below listed personnel were transferred for further treatment and returned to this vessel for duty (December 12, 1944, and return same day):

EVERS, Adelbert Ray	Lieut., DE-V(G)	97949	
THIELGES, Bernard Andrew	Lieut., USN	165526	
HELLER, George William	Lieut(jg), D-V(G)	187576	
MULLINS, Lawrence Joseph Jr.	Lieut(jg), D-V(G)	267414	
AJEMIAN, Baret Vahan	Lieut(jg), USN	283281	
BEHRENS, John (n)	CY(AA)(T), V-6	662 02 29	
BULLOCK, James Louis	FC2c(T), V-6	611 53 15	
BUSH, Phillip Lyal	Slc, V-6	553 00 78	
CAMPBELL, Thomas (n)	Slc(FCO), V-6	313 52 68	
CHEVALIER, Fredrick Odessa	FCO2c(T), V-6	721 65 55	
DARNELL, Harold Racey	S2c, V-6	338 65 80	
DODSON, Caryl Potter	S2c	342 88 01	
GERBER, William Joseph	S2c	383 16 11	
HANGER, Marvin Del	FC2c	376 52 05	
SIVO, Walter	QM2c, V-6	642 33 59	
WILENSKI, Teddy Chester	MoMM2c, V-6	642 28 11	

Total - 16

Total all casualties - 73